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Abstract 
We examine the evolution of monetary policy rules in a group of inflation targeting countries 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom), applying a moment-based 
estimator in a time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. Using this novel 
flexible framework, our main findings are threefold. First, monetary policy rules change gradually, 
pointing to the importance of applying a time-varying estimation framework. Second, the interest 
rate smoothing parameter is much lower than typically reported by previous time-invariant 
estimates of policy rules. External factors matter for all countries, although the importance of the 
exchange rate diminishes after the adoption of inflation targeting. Third, the response of interest 
rates to inflation is particularly strong during periods when central bankers want to break a record 
of high inflation, such as in the UK or Australia at the beginning of the 1980s. Contrary to 
common wisdom, the response becomes less aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting, 
suggesting a positive anchoring effect of this regime on inflation expectations. This result is 
supported by our finding that inflation persistence as well as the policy neutral rate typically 
decreased after the adoption of inflation targeting. 
  
JEL Classification: E43, E52, E58. 
Keywords: Taylor rule, inflation targeting, monetary policy, time-varying parameter model, 
endogenous regressors. 
 
* We thank Aleš Bulíř, Peter Claeys, Øyvind Eitrheim, Michal Franta, Dana Hájková, Gabriel 
Perez-Quiros, Ekkehart Schlicht, Pierre Siklos, Miloslav Vošvrda and the seminar participants at 
the 7th Norges Annual Monetary Policy Conference, the Czech National Bank, the Institute of 
Information Theory and Automation (Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic), the 
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and the XXXIVth Symposium of the Spanish Economic 
Association for helpful discussions. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of 
the Czech National Bank. Support from the Czech Science Foundation under grant 
402/09/H045 and support from the Grant Agency of Charles University (GAUK) under project 
46108 are gratefully acknowledged. Emails: jaromir.baxa@centrum.cz, 
roman.horvath@gmail.com, borek.vasicek@gmail.com. 
 2 
1 Introduction 
Taylor-type regressions have been applied extensively in order to describe monetary policy setting 
for many countries. The research on U.S. monetary policy usually assumes that monetary policy 
was subject to structural breaks when the Fed chairman changed. Clarida et al. (2000) claims that 
the U.S. inflation during the 1970s was unleashed because the Fed’s interest rate response to the 
inflation upsurge was too weak, while the increase of such response in the 1980s was behind the 
inflation moderation. Although there is ongoing discussion on the sources of this Great 
Moderation (Benati and Surico, 2009), it is generally accepted that monetary policy setting 
evolves over time.  
 
The evolution of monetary policy setting as well as exogenous changes in the economic system 
over time raises several issues for empirical analysis. In particular, the coefficients of monetary 
policy rules estimated over longer periods are structurally unstable. The solution used in the 
literature is typically sub-sample analysis (Clarida et al., 1998, 2000). Such an approach is based on 
the rather strong assumption that the timing of structural breaks is known, but also that policy 
setting does not evolve within each sub-period. Consequently, this gives impetus to applying an 
empirical framework that allows for regime changes or, in other words, time variance in the 
model parameters (Cogley and Sargent, 2001, 2005). Countries that have implemented the 
inflation targeting (IT) regime are especially suitable for such analysis because it is likely that the 
monetary policy stance with respect to inflation and other macroeconomic variables changed as a 
consequence of the implementation of IT. Moreover, there is ongoing debate of to what extent 
IT represents a rule-based policy. Bernanke et al. (1999) claim that IT is a framework or 
constrained discretion rather than a mechanical rule. Consequently, the monetary policy rule of 
an IT central bank is likely to be time varying. 
 
Our study aims to investigate the evolution of monetary policy for countries that have long 
experience with the IT regime. In particular, we analyze the time-varying monetary policy rules 
for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom. As we are interested in 
monetary policy evolution over a relatively long period, we do not consider countries where IT 
has been in place for a relatively short time (Finland, Spain), or was introduced relatively recently 
(such as Armenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Norway and South Africa). We apply the 
recently developed time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors (Kim and Nelson, 
2006), as this technique allows us to evaluate changes in policy rules over time, and, unlike 
Markov-switching methods, does not impose sudden policy switches between different regimes. 
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On top of that, it also deals with endogeneity of policy rules. Unlike Kim and Nelson (2006) we 
do not rely on the Kalman filter, which is conventionally employed to estimate time-varying 
models, but employ the moment-based estimator proposed by Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006)1 for 
its mathematical and descriptive transparency and minimal requirements as regards initial 
conditions. In addition, Kim and Nelson (2006) apply their estimator to evaluate changes in U.S. 
monetary policy, while we focus on inflation targeting economies.  
 
Anticipating our results, we find that monetary policy changes gradually, pointing to the 
importance of applying a time-varying estimation framework (see also Koop et al., 2009, on 
evidence that monetary policy changes gradually rather than abruptly). When the issue of 
endogeneity in time-varying monetary policy rules is neglected, the parameters are estimated 
inconsistently, even though the resulting errors are economically not large. Second, the interest 
rate smoothing parameter is much lower than typically reported by previous time-invariant 
estimates of policy rules. This is in line with a recent critique by Rudebusch (2006), who 
emphasizes that the degree of smoothing is rather low. External factors matter for understanding 
the interest rate setting process for all countries, although the importance of the exchange rate 
diminishes after the adoption of inflation targeting. Third, the response of interest rates to 
inflation is particularly strong during periods when central bankers want to break a record of high 
inflation, such as in the UK at the beginning of the 1980s. Contrary to common wisdom, the 
response can become less aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting, suggesting a 
positive anchoring effect of this regime on inflation expectations or a low inflation environment. 
This result is consistent with Kuttner and Posen (1999) and Sekine and Teranishi (2008), who 
show that inflation targeting can be associated with a smaller response of the interest rate to 
inflation developments if the previous inflation record was favorable. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes 
our data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. An 
appendix with a detailed description of the methodology and additional results follows.  
 
                                                                                       
1 The description of this estimator is also available in Schlicht (2005), but we refer to the more recent working paper 
version, where this estimator is described in a great detail. Several important parts of this framework were introduced 
already in Schlicht (1981). 
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2 Related Literature 
2.1 Monetary policy rules and inflation targeting 
Although the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy usually distinguishes between 
instrument rules (the Taylor rule) and targeting rules (the inflation-targeting based rule), the 
forward-looking specification of the Taylor rule, sometimes augmented with other variables, has 
commonly been used for the analysis of decision making of IT central banks. The existing studies 
feature great diversity of empirical frameworks, which makes the comparison of their results 
sometimes complicated. In the following we provide a selective survey of empirical studies aimed 
at the countries that we focus on. 
 
The United Kingdom adopted IT in 1992 (currently a 2% target and a ±1% tolerance band) and 
the policy of the Bank of England (BoE) is subject to the most extensive empirical research. 
Clarida et al. (1998) analyzed the monetary policy setting of the BoE in the pre-IT period, 
concluding that it was consistent with the Taylor rule, yet additionally constrained by foreign 
(German) interest rate setting. Adam et al. (2005) find by means of sub-sample analysis that the 
introduction of IT did not represent a major change in monetary policy conduct, unlike the 
granting of instrument independence in 1997. Davradakis and Taylor (2006) point to significant 
asymmetry of British monetary policy during the IT period; in particular the BoE was concerned 
with inflation only when it significantly exceeded its target. Assenmacher-Wesche (2006) 
concludes by means of a Markov-switching model that no attention was paid to inflation until IT 
was adopted. Conversely, Kishor (2008) finds that the response to inflation had already increased, 
especially after Margaret Thatcher became prime minister (in 1979). Finally, Trecroci and Vassalli 
(2009) use a model with time-varying coefficients and conclude that policy had been getting 
gradually more inflation averse since the early 1980s. 
 
New Zealand was the first country to adopt IT (in 1990). A particular feature besides the 
announcement of the inflation target (currently a band of 1–3%) is that the governor of the 
Reserve Bank (RBNZ) has an explicit agreement with the government. Huang et al. (2001) study 
the monetary policy rule over the first decade of IT. He finds that the policy of the RBNZ was 
clearly aimed at the inflation target and did not respond to output fluctuations explicitly. The 
response to inflation was symmetric and a backward-looking rule does as good a job as a 
forward-looking one at tracking the interest rate dynamics. Plantier and Scrimgeour (2002) allow 
for the possibility that the neutral real interest rate (implicitly assumed in the Taylor rule to be 
constant) changes in time. In this framework they find that the response to inflation increased 
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after IT was implemented and the policy neutral interest rate tailed away. Ftiti (2008) additionally 
confirms that the RBNZ did not explicitly respond to exchange rate fluctuations and Karedekikli 
and Lees (2007) disregard asymmetries in the RBNZ policy rule. 
 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) turned to IT in 1993 (with a target of 2–3%) after decades 
of exchange rate pegs (till 1984) and consecutive monetary targeting.2 De Brouwer and Gilbert 
(2005) using sub-sample analysis confirm that the RBA’s consideration of inflation was very low 
in the pre-IT period and a concern for output stabilization was clearly predominant. The 
response to inflation (both actual and expected) increased substantially after IT adoption but the 
RBA seemed to consider exchange rate and foreign interest rate developments as well. Leu and 
Sheen (2006) find a lot of discretionality in the RBA’s policy (a low fit of the time-invariant rule) 
in the pre-IT period, a consistent response to inflation during IT, and signs of asymmetry in both 
periods. Karedekikli and Lees (2007) document that the policy asymmetry is related to the RBA’s 
distaste for negative output gaps.  
 
The Bank of Canada (BoC) introduced IT in 1991 in the form of a series of targets for reducing 
inflation to the midpoint of the range of 1–3% by the end of 1995 (since then the target has 
remained unchanged). Demers and Rodríguez (2002) find that the implementation of this 
framework was distinguished by a higher inflation response, but the increase in the response to 
real economic activity was even more significant. Shih and Giles (2009) model the duration 
analysis of BoC interest rate changes with respect to different macroeconomic variables. They 
find that annual core inflation and the monthly growth rate of real GDP drive the changes of the 
policy rate, while the unemployment rate and the exchange rate do not. On the contrary, Dong 
(2008) confirms that the BoC considers real exchange rate movements. 
 
Sweden adopted IT in 1993 (a 2% target with a tolerance band of 1 percentage point) just after 
the krona had been allowed to float. The independence of Sveriges Riksbank (SR) was legally 
increased in 1999. Jansson and Vredin (2003) studied its policy rule, concluding that the inflation 
forecast (published by the Riksbank) is the only relevant variable driving interest rate changes. 
Kuttner (2004) additionally finds a role for the output gap, but in terms of its growth forecast 
(rather than its observed value). Berg et al. (2004) provide a rigorous analysis of the sources of 
deviations between the SR policy rate and the targets implied by diverse empirical rules. They 
                                                                                       
2
 In Australia, the adoption of inflation targeting was a gradual process. As from January 1990, the RBA increased 
the frequency of its communications via speeches and the style of the Bank’s Bulletin started to correspond to the 
inflation reports as introduced in New Zealand. The exact inflation target was defined explicitly later, in April 1993. 
Greenville (1997) describes the policy changes in Australia in great detail.  
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claim that higher inflation forecasts at the early stages of the IT regime (due to a lack of 
credibility) generate a higher implied target from the forward-looking rule and therefore induce 
spurious indications of policy shocks. Their qualitative analysis of SR documents clarifies the 
rationale behind actual policy shocks, such as more gradualism (stronger inertia) in periods of 
macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 
Finally, there are a few multi-country studies. Meirelles Aurelio (2005) analyzes the time-invariant 
rules of the same countries as us, finding significant dependence of the results on real-time versus 
historical measures of variables. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) estimate by Bayesian methods an 
open economy structural model of four IT countries (AUS, CAN, NZ, UK) with the aim of 
seeing whether IT central banks respond to exchange rate movements. They confirm this claim 
for the BoE and BoC. Dong (2008) enriches their setting by incorporating some more realistic 
assumptions (exchange rate endogeneity, incomplete exchange-rate pass-through), finding 
additionally a response to the exchange rate for the RBA. 
 
2.2 Time variance in monetary policy rules 
The original empirical research on monetary policy rules used a linear specification with time-
invariant coefficients. Instrument variable estimators such as the GMM gained popularity in this 
context, because they are able to deal with the issue of endogeneity that arises in the forward-
looking specification (Clarida et al., 1998).3 While a time-invariant policy rule may be a reasonable 
approximation when the analyzed period is short, structural stability usually fails over longer 
periods. 
 
The simplest empirical strategy for taking time variance into account is to use sub-sample analysis 
(Taylor, 1999; Clarida et al., 2000). The drawback of this approach is its rather subjective 
assumptions about points of structural change and structural stability within each sub-period. An 
alternative is to apply an econometric model that allows time variance for the coefficients. There 
are various methods dealing with time variance in the context of estimated monetary policy rules. 
 
The most common option is the Markov-switching VAR method, originally used for business 
cycle analysis. Valente (2003) employs such a model with switches in the constant term 
                                                                                       
3 One exception is when a researcher uses real-time central bank forecasts for Taylor-type rule estimation, i.e. the 
data available to the central bank before the monetary policy meeting. In such case, the endogeneity problem will not 
arise and least squares estimation may perform well (Orphanides, 2001). However, as we will discuss in more detail 
below, the use of real-time data may not solve the issue of endogeneity completely. 
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representing the evolution of the inflation target (the inflation target together with the real 
equilibrium interest rate makes the constant term in a simple Taylor rule). Assenmacher-Wesche 
(2006) uses the Markov-switching model with shifts both in the coefficients and in the residual 
variances. Such separation between the evolution of policy preferences (coefficients) and 
exogenous changes in the economic system (residuals) is important for the continuing discussion 
on the sources of the Great Moderation (Benati and Surico, 2008; Canova and Gambetti, 2008). 
Sims and Zha (2006) present a multivariate model with discrete breaks in both coefficients and 
disturbances. Unlike Assenmacher-Wesche they find that the variance of the shock rather than 
the time variance of the monetary policy rule coefficient has shaped macroeconomic 
developments in the U.S. in the last four decades. 
 
The application of Markov-switching VAR techniques turns out to be complicated for IT 
countries, where the policy rules are usually characterized as forward-looking and some regressors 
become endogenous. The endogeneity bias can be avoided by means of a backward-looking 
specification (lagged explanatory variables), but this is very probably inappropriate for IT central 
banks, which are arguably forward-looking.4 However, there is another distinct feature of the 
Markov-switching model that makes its use for the analysis of time variance in the monetary 
policy rule rather questionable. The model assumes sudden switches from one policy regime to 
another rather than a gradual evolution of monetary policy. Although at first sight one may 
consider the introduction of IT to be an abrupt change, there are some reasons to believe that a 
smooth monetary policy transition is a more appropriate description for IT countries (Koop et 
al., 2009). Firstly, the IT regime is typically based on predictability and transparency, which does 
not seem to be consistent with sudden switches. Secondly, it is likely that inflation played a role in 
interest rate setting even before the IT regime was introduced, because in many countries a major 
decrease of inflation rates occurred before IT was implemented. Thirdly, the coefficients of 
different variables (such as inflation, the output gap or the exchange rate) in the monetary policy 
rule may evolve independently rather than moving from one regime to another at the same time 
(see also Darvas, 2009). For instance, a central bank may assign more weight to the observed or 
expected inflation rate when it implements IT, but that does not mean that it immediately 
disregards information on real economic activity or foreign interest rates. Finally, there is relevant 
evidence, though mostly for the U.S., that monetary policy evolves rather smoothly over time 
(Boivin, 2006; Canova and Gambetti, 2008; Koop et al., 2009). Therefore, based on this research, 
a smooth transition seems to be a more appropriate description of reality. In a similar manner, it 
                                                                                       
4 Psaradakis et al. (2006) proposed a solution to the endogeneity problem in the context of the Markov-switching 
model in the case of the term structure of interest rates. 
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is possible to estimate the policy rule using STAR-type models. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that STAR-type models assume a specific type of smooth transition between regimes, which can 
be more restrictive than the flexible random walk specification that we employ in this paper. 
Therefore, we leave the empirical examination of Markov-switching as well as STAR-type models 
for further research.5 
 
Besides simple recursive regression (e.g. Domenech et al., 2002), the Kalman filter has been 
employed in a few studies to estimate a coefficient vector that varies over time. Such a time-
varying model is also suitable for reflection of possible asymmetry of the monetary policy rule 
(Dolado et al., 2004).6 An example of such asymmetry is that the policy maker responds more 
strongly to the inflation rate when it is high than when it is low. Boivin (2006) uses such a time-
varying model estimated via the Kalman filter for the U.S., Elkhoury (2006) does the same for 
Switzerland, and Trecroci and Vassalli (2010) do so for the U.S., the UK, Germany, France and 
Italy. However, none of these studies provides a specific econometric treatment to the 
endogeneity that arises in forward-looking specifications. 
 
In this respect, Kim (2006) proposes a two-step procedure for dealing with the endogeneity 
problem in the time-varying parameter model. Kim and Nelson (2006) find with this 
methodology that U.S. monetary policy has evolved in a different manner than suggested by 
previous research. In particular, the Fed’s interest in stabilizing real economic activity has 
significantly increased since the early 1990s.7 Kishor (2008) applies the same technique for 
analysis of the time-varying monetary policy rules of Japan, Germany, the UK, France and Italy. 
                                                                                       
5
 We run a number of experiments on simulated data with the true coefficients containing large sudden shifts to see 
whether the estimated coefficients are gradually changing or shifting. The specification of the basic experiment was 
as follows: The intercept follows a slowly moving random walk (variance of innovations set to 0.3). For the 
independent variable we used expected inflation in the UK, with the beta coefficient set to 0.75 up to the 60th 
observation and 1.75 afterwards. Then we included a lag of the dependent variable with a constant coefficient equal 
to 0.5 and residuals with distribution N(0.15). The dependent variable was generated as the sum of these 
components. This example can be linked to a reaction function of a hypothetical central bank that smoothes the 
interest rate, that does not have the output gap in its reaction function, and that changed its aggressiveness abruptly 
in the middle of the sample. Then we estimated the model using the VC method and stored the value of the 
estimated change of the beta coefficient at the time of the switch in the data generating process. We repeated this 
small experiment 30 times for different sets of intercept and residuals and the estimated value of the switch was 0.98 
on average, ranging from 0.9 to 1.02. The average sizes of the innovations in beta were below 0.09 in the remaining 
part of the samples. Clearly, in this simple setting an abrupt change in policy is detected by the model with respect to 
the size and timing of that change. Further experiments contained more variables in the reaction function and more 
switches going upwards and downwards as well. We found that, generally, sudden changes (larger than the average 
changes in the other time-varying coefficients) in the true coefficients resulted in switches in the estimated time-
varying coefficients, too, and the varying coefficients did not imply gradual changes in these cases. Nevertheless, the 
ability of the time-varying parameter models to identify sudden structural breaks in parameters remains to be 
confirmed by careful Monte Carlo simulations, as pointed out by Sekine and Teranishi (2008). 
6 Granger (2008) shows that any non-linear model can be approximated by a time-varying parameter linear model. 
7 Kim et al. (2006) confirmed this finding with real-time data and additionally detected a significant decrease in the 
response to expected inflation during the 1990s. 
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He detects a time-varying response not only with respect to the inflation rate and the output gap, 
but also with respect to the foreign interest rate. The relevance of endogeneity correction can be 
demonstrated by the difference between Kishor’s results and those of Trecroci and Vassalli 
(2010), who both study the same sample of countries.8 The time-varying parameter model with 
specific treatment of endogeneity can be relevant even when real-time data are used instead of 
ex-post data (Orphanides, 2001). When the real-time forecast is not derived under the 
assumption that nominal interest rates will remain constant within the forecast horizon, 
endogeneity may still be present in the model (see Boivin, 2006). Moreover, this estimation 
procedure is also viable for reflecting measurement error and heteroscedasticity in the model 
(Kim et al., 2006). However, the Kalman filter applied to a state-space model may suffer one 
important drawback in small samples: it is rather sensitive to the initial values of parameters 
which are unknown. The moment-based estimator proposed by Schlicht (1981), Schlicht (2005) 
and Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006), which is employed in our paper and described below, allows 
this problem to be avoided. Moreover, it is flexible enough to incorporate the endogeneity 
correction proposed by Kim (2006). 
 
3 Empirical Methodology  
3.1 The empirical model 
In line with Taylor (1993) most empirical studies’ models assume that the central bank targets the 
nominal interest rate in line with the state of the economy (see Clarida et al., 1998, 2000). Such 
policy rule, which in the case of an IT central bank is arguably forward-looking, can be written as 
follows:  
                               ( )* *t t i t t i t j tr r E E yβ pi pi γ+ + + = +  Ω  − + Ω                            (1) 
 
where *tr  denotes the targeted interest rate, r is the policy neutral rate
9, t ipi +  stands for the 
central bank forecast of the yearly inflation rate i periods ahead, and *
t i
pi
+
 is the central bank’s 
inflation target.10 t jy +  represents a measure of the output gap. [ ]E is the expectation operator 
and tΩ  is the information set available at the time t when interest rates are set. Eq. (1) links the 
                                                                                       
8 Horváth (2009) employs the time-varying model with endogenous regressors for estimation of the neutral interest 
rate for the Czech Republic and confirms the importance of endogeneity bias correction terms. 
9 The policy neutral rate is typically defined as the sum of the real equilibrium rate and expected inflation. 
10 The definition of the inflation target varies slightly across IT countries. However, the target is usually mid-term 
rather than short-term. The target value can also vary over time. This variation has been especially pronounced in 
emerging countries that implemented IT as a gradual disinflation strategy. By contrast, for the countries studied here, 
the target value has not changed significantly over time. 
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policy instrument (nominal interest rates) to a constant term (the neutral rate that would prevail if 
expected inflation and output were at their targeted levels), the deviation of expected inflation 
from its target value and the output gap. 
 
Nevertheless, Eq. (1) is often argued to be too restrictive to provide a reasonable description of 
actual interest rate setting. First, it does not account for interest rate smoothing by central banks. 
In line with Clarida et al. (1998) most studies assume that the central bank adjusts the interest rate 
sluggishly to the targeted value. This can be tracked by a simple partial-adjustment mechanism: 
 
                                                      ( ) *1 1t t tr r rρ ρ−= + −                                                  (2) 
 
where [ ]0,1ρ ∈  is the smoothing parameter. Although this is line with the common wisdom 
that central banks are averse to abrupt changes, most studies that estimate time-invariant models 
find unusually high policy inertia. For instance, using quarterly data ρ typically exceeds 0.8. 
Rudebusch (2006) points to an inconsistency between this finding and the practical impossibility 
to predict interest rate changes over a few quarters. Therefore, it is possible that the lagged 
dependent value takes over the impact of either autocorrelated shocks or omitted variables. The 
intensity of interest rate smoothing is logically reinforced in a linear time-invariant specification, 
as the response to some variables can be asymmetric and/or vary in time. Second, Eq. (1) 
assumes that the central bank aims only at the inflation rate and the output gap. However, many 
central banks that have implemented IT are in small open economies and may consider additional 
variables, in particular the exchange rate and the foreign interest rate, hence Eq. (1) can be 
extended for txδ , where the coefficient δ  measures the impact of additional variable tx on 
interest rate setting. Therefore, in our empirical model we substitute Eq. (2) into Eq. (1), 
eliminating unobserved forecast variables and including additional variables, which results in Eq. 
(3): 
 
                    ( ) ( )* 11t t i t i t t t tr y x rρ α β pi pi γ δ ρ ε+ + − = − + − + + + +                      (3) 
 
Also, α  is a constant term which in Eq. (1) coincides with the policy neutral rate r . However, 
if the model is augmented by additional variables that are not in the form of deviations from the 
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target value, the constant term need not keep this interpretation. We set i equal to 2.11 
Consequently, the disturbance term tε  is a combination of forecast errors and is thus orthogonal 
to all information available at time t ( tΩ ). 
 
In line with our previous discussion, the interest rate rule described above will be estimated 
within a framework that allows time variance of the coefficients. Kim (2006) shows that the 
conventional time-varying parameter model (the Kalman filter applied to a state-space 
representation) delivers inconsistent estimates when the explanatory variables are correlated with 
the disturbance term. Endogeneity arises in forward-looking policy rules based on ex-post data, 
but it can appear even with real-time data, as discussed before. Kim (2006) proposes an estimator 
of the time-varying coefficient model with endogenous regressors. A few recent contributions 
use this framework for estimation of monetary policy rules (Kim and Nelson, 2006, Kim et al. 
2006, Kishor, 2008). 12 Following Kim (2006) we can rewrite Eq. (3) as follows:  
 
       ( ) ( ) 11t t t t t i t t t t t t tr y x rρ α β pi γ δ ρ ε+ −= − + + + + +                                        (4) 
                                             1 1,t t tα α ϑ−= + , ( )121, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                             (5) 
                                            1 2,t t tβ β ϑ−= + , ( )222, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                             (6) 
                                            1 3,t t tγ γ ϑ−= + , ( )323, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                              (7) 
                                             1 4,t t tδ δ ϑ−= + , ( )424, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                             (8) 
                                            1 5,t t tρ ρ ϑ−= + , ( )525, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                             (9) 
                                           't i t j tZ ϕpi ξ σ ϕ+ −= + , ( )~ . . . 0,1t i i d Nϕ                                         (10) 
                                            't t j ty Z νψ σ ν−= + , ( )~ . . . 0,1t i i d Nν                                          (11) 
 
The measurement equation (4) of the state-space representation is the monetary policy rule. The 
transition equations (5)–(9) describe the time-varying coefficients as a random walk process 
without drift. Eqs. (10) and (11) track the relationship between the endogenous regressors ( it+pi  
                                                                                       
11 Although the targeting horizon of central banks is usually longer (4–8 quarters), we prefer to proxy inflation 
expectations by inflation in t+2 for the following reasons. First, the endogeneity correction requires a strong 
correlation between the endogenous regressor and its instruments. Second, the prediction error logically increases at 
longer horizons. Third, the countries we analyze did not apply inflation targeting during the whole estimation period. 
Consequently, it is preferable owing to data limitations to keep only two inflation leads rather than four or six. 
12 Note, however, that two of these contributions are, to our knowledge, unpublished as yet. 
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and ty ) and their instruments, tZ . The list of instruments, jtZ − , is as follows: 1−tpi , 4tpi − , 1ty − , 
2ty − , 1−tr  and 
+
tr (foreign interest rate). Unlike Kim (2006), we assume that the parameters in Eqs. 
(10) and (11) are time-invariant. Next, the correlation between the standardized residuals tϕ  and 
tν and tε  is εϕκ ,  and ενκ , , respectively (note that ϕσ  and νσ  are standard errors of tϕ  and tν , 
respectively). The consistent estimates of the coefficients in Eq. (4) are obtained in two steps. In 
the first step, we estimate equations (10) and (11) and save the standardized residuals tϕ  and tν . 
In the second step, we estimate Eq. (12) below along with Eqs. (5)–(9). Note that (12) now 
includes bias correction terms13, i.e. the (standardized) residuals from Eqs. (10) and (11), to 
address the aforementioned endogeneity of the regressors. Consequently, the estimated 
parameters in Eq. (12) are consistent, as tζ  is uncorrelated with the regressors. 
 
( ) ( ) 11t t t t t i t t t t t t ν,ε ε,t t ,ε ε,t t tr pi y x r κ σ ν κ σϕρ α β γ δ ρ ϕ ζ+ −= − + + + + + + +    
,  ( )2 2 2, , ,~ 0, (1 )t v tN ε ϕ ε εζ κ κ σ− −                                                                                 (12) 
 
The standard framework for second-step estimation is the maximum likelihood estimator via the 
Kalman filter (Kim, 2006). However, there are several difficulties with the estimation of the 
Kalman filter (and Kalman smoother) in applied work. First, if the variables are nonstationary, 
the results often depend on the proper choice of the initial values, but those values are not 
known in advance.14 The problem with the initial conditions is larger if one-sided estimates are 
used, as illustrated in Leigh (2008) on estimates of the time-varying natural rate of interest in the 
U.S. Applying the Kalman smoother alleviates the issue and the differences in the estimates at the 
beginning of the sample decrease sharply. Second, the log likelihood function is highly nonlinear 
and in some cases the optimization algorithm fails to minimize the negative of the log likelihood 
for several reasons (either it can fail to calculate the Hessian matrix throughout the iteration 
process or, when the likelihood function is approximated to facilitate the computations, the 
covariance matrix of the observation vector can become singular for the provided starting 
values). 
 
                                                                                       
13 Obviously, if the correction terms are statistically significant, it shows that endogeneity matters. Similarly to Kim 
and Nelson (2006) and Horváth (2009), we find that these terms are typically significant: in our sample the 
endogeneity correction for inflation is significant for all countries except the UK at least at the 10% level, and for the 
GDP gap it is significant for Canada (see table A.1 in the Appendix). 
14 Although there are a number of formal procedures for initialization of the Kalman filter in such cases (for example 
see Koopman et al., 1999), fundamental uncertainty about their values remains. 
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In this paper, we adopt the “varying coefficients” (VC) method (Schlicht and Ludsteck, 2006). 
The VC method generalizes the standard ordinary least squares approach. In fact, instead of 
minimizing the sum of the squares of the residuals 2
1
T
t
t=
ζ∑ , it uses minimization of the weighted 
sum of the squares: 
 
                                   
2 2 2 2
1 1,t 2 2,t n n,t
1 1 1 1
T T T T
t
t= t= t= t=
+ θ +θ + θζ ϑ ϑ ϑ… +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑                            (13) 
 
where the weights iθ  are the inverse variance ratios of the regression residuals tζ  and the shocks 
in the time-varying coefficients iϑ , that is, 2 2/i iθ = σ σ . Hence it balances the fit of the model and 
the parameter stability.15. Additionally, the time averages of the regression coefficients estimated 
by such weighted least squares estimator are identical to the GLS estimates of the corresponding 
regression with fixed coefficients, that is, 
1
1
ˆ ˆ
T
t GLS
t=
a = a
T ∑
. 
 
The VC method has a number of advantages. First, it does not require initial conditions even for 
non-stationary variables prior to the estimation procedure. Instead, both the variance ratios and 
the coefficients are estimated simultaneously. Second, the property of the estimator that the time 
averages of the estimated time-varying coefficients are equal to their time-invariant counterparts 
permits easier interpretation of the results by comparison with time-invariant results. The features 
of the VC method make it feasible for our analysis: we deal with a time-varying model where the 
coefficients are assumed to follow a random walk, there is no a priori information about the initial 
values and the time series are rather short.16 
 
Furthermore, Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006) compare the results from the VC method and from 
the Kalman filter, showing that both estimators give very similar results given the assumption 
                                                                                       
15 It should be noted that throughout our computations we did not have to solve problems with convergence of the 
moment estimator, as it was almost always able to find equilibrium. Computational details of the VC method are 
described in the Appendix. Originally, Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006) start with a derivation of the maximum 
likelihood estimator of parameters a based on the idea of orthogonal parameterization, which is described in the 
Appendix. Then they prove that the weighted least squares estimator is identical to the maximum likelihood 
estimator and also that the likelihood estimator is identical to the moment estimator for very large samples. 
16 The number of observations differs across the countries, ranging from 89 to 144. In the case of Kalman filter we 
can utilize the whole sample if we opt for initial conditions equal to the full sample OLS estimated values 
(recommended for stationary systems). Another approach derives the initial conditions related directly to the 
beginning of the sample from the first subset of available observations and the Kalman filter is performed on the 
latter part of the sample. Kim and Nelson (2006) adopted this approach and used the first 40 observations for the 
initialization. The estimation of the second step is carried out by Schlicht’s VC package, which uses the moment 
estimator.  
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that the Kalman filter is initialized with the correct initial conditions. Yet in this case, the VC 
estimator has a slightly lower mean squared error and this difference is more pronounced for 
small samples.17  
 
We assume that the variance of the disturbance term in Eq. (12) is not time-varying. 
Nevertheless, there is an ongoing discussion about to what extent changes in the macroeconomic 
environment are driven by changes in the variance of the disturbance term (i.e. exogenous 
changes in the economic system) vis-à-vis the variance in the coefficients of the monetary policy 
rule (see, for example, Benati and Surico, 2008, Canova and Gambetti, 2008, or Sims and Zha, 
2006).  
 
One can also think about Eqs. (4), (10) and (11) in terms of the New Keynesian model, with Eqs. 
(10) and (11) representing the Phillips and IS curves. It should be noted that our framework is in 
general less restrictive and imposes less structure than the full-blown New Keynesian model. 
 
We expect tβ  to be positive, as the central bank is likely to react to an increase in expected 
inflation by increasing its policy rate. In particular, tβ should be greater than one in the long-run 
solution of Eq. (4) if monetary policy is stabilizing. The development of tβ  over time may be 
driven by a number of factors, such as changes in monetary policy regime or institutional 
constraints (Adam et al., 2005). The effect of the adoption of inflation targeting on tβ  is 
ambiguous. As put forward by Kuttner and Posen (1999), tβ  can both increase and decrease. 
They show that under a conservative central bank the response of short-term interest rates is 
greater than under discretion or the optimal state-contingent rule (inflation targeting),18 while the 
strength of the response under inflation targeting as compared to discretion depends on the 
credibility of the regime. Credible monetary policy does not have to react so strongly to inflation 
surprises, as inflation expectations are likely to remain anchored. Sekine and Teranishi (2008) 
provide a new Keynesian model that reaches to the same conclusions. Siklos and Weymark 
                                                                                       
17
 For comparison, we estimated equation (12) using the conventional Kalman filter in the GROCER software using 
the function tvp (Dubois-Michaux, 2009). We parameterized the model with initial conditions taken from the OLS 
estimates of the parameters on the full sample and the initial forecast error covariance matrix set to 0. The matrix of 
the residuals of the time-varying coefficients is assumed to be diagonal as in the VC method. The results were very 
similar to those obtained from the VC method, with the estimated variances being the same in both methods. The 
only country where the estimated variance was different, was Sweden, with a lower variance in smoothing parameter 
ρ and higher a variance in β. Still, the results were consistent with ours. These results are available upon request. 
18 See King (1997) on how inflation targeting allows one to come close to the optimal state-contingent rule. 
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(2009) estimate that inflation targeting in Australia, Canada and New Zealand reduced the 
magnitude of the interest rate changes to needed to maintain a low inflation environment.  
 
Similarly, ρ , a measure of interest rate smoothing, is expected to be positive with values between 
zero and one. Many time-invariant estimates of monetary policy rules find the value of this 
parameter to be about 0.7–0.9, implying a substantial degree of interest rate smoothing. 
Rudebusch (2006) claims that such figures are clearly overestimated in the face of very low 
interest rate forecastability in the term structure of interest rates. On the contrary, the time-
varying model in principle enables some variables to affect interest rate setting in one period but 
not in another, and is less prone to autocorrelated shocks. 
 
Next, the effect of the output gap, tγ , on interest rates is expected to be positive or insignificant. 
In the first case, the central bank may have an explicit concern for real activity or understand the 
output gap as a useful predictor of future inflation. In the latter case, the insignificant coefficient 
may suggest that the central bank is primarily focused on inflation and does not consider the 
output gap to be important in delivering low inflation. 
 
There is a debate in literature about whether other variables should be included in the monetary 
policy rule. This is especially appealing for small open economies, which may be concerned with 
exchange rate fluctuations as well as the evolution of foreign interest rates. Taylor (2001) puts 
forward that even if the exchange rate or foreign interest rates are not explicitly included in the 
policy rule, they still remain present implicitly, as the exchange rate influences the inflation 
forecast, to which the inflation-targeting central bank is likely to react. It is also worth 
emphasizing that significance of the exchange rate or foreign interest rates does not necessarily 
mean that the central bank targets some particular values of these variables, but rather that the 
bank considers foreign developments to be important for its inflation forecast. On the other 
hand, empirical studies often favor the inclusion of these variables in the estimated policy rule. 
Having these considerations in mind, we decided to include the exchange rate and foreign 
interest rates, too, in order to assess whether these two variables carry any additional information 
for understanding the interest rate setting process in our sample countries. 
 
3.2 The dataset 
We use quarterly data. The sample period varies from country to country owing to data 
availability (the UK 1975:1Q–2007:4Q, Australia 1975:1Q–2007:4Q, Canada 1975:1Q–2007:4Q, 
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New Zealand 1985:1Q–2007:3Q, Sweden 1982:2Q–2007:3Q), but on average the time coverage 
is about three decades.  
 
Following Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), the dependent variable is the short-term interest rate, 
which is typically closely linked to the monetary policy rate. The reason for choosing the short-
term interest rate rather than the monetary policy rate is the fact that the monetary policy rate 
and the change therein are censored (Podpiera, 2008). Therefore, the dependent variables 
capturing the policy rate are the discount rate (3-month Treasury bills) for the UK, the interbank 
3-month interest rate for Australia, the 3-month Treasury bills rate for Canada, the overnight 
interbank 90-day interest rate for NZ and the interbank 3-month interest rate for Sweden. We 
choose the interest rate so as to be closely linked to monetary policy, but also to be available for a 
sufficiently long period. The foreign interest rate is the German 3-month Euribor for the UK and 
Sweden and the U.S. 3-month interbank interest rate for Australia, NZ, and Canada. 
 
The inflation is measured as the year-on-year change in the CPI, except for the UK, where we use 
the RPIX (the retail price index excluding mortgage interest payments), and the NZ, where we 
use the CPIX (the CPI without interest payments).19  
 
The output gap is taken as reported in the OECD Economic Outlook (the production function 
method based on the NAWRU – the non-accelerating wages rate of unemployment), except for 
NZ, where this series is short and where we use the output gap derived from the Hodrick-
Prescott filter applied to the GDP series (constant prices, seasonally adjusted).20 The exchange 
rate is measured by the chain-linked nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), except for Canada, 
where we use the bilateral USD/CAD exchange rate. For the regressions we use the deviation of 
the index from the HP trend (first differences were used for a robustness check) – see also Lubik 
and Schorfheide (2007).  
 
                                                                                       
19 We use year-on-year data, as the inflation target is also defined on a year-on-year basis. 
20 There is no agreement on what is the best method for extraction of the unobserved output gap (Billmeier, 2009). 
We prefer to use the output gaps obtained by the OECD by means of the production function approach because 
they are based on a substantially richer information set than simple statistical detrending. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
OECD output gap and the simple HP gap evolve very closely.  
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4 Results 
This section presents the country-specific estimates of the time-varying monetary policy rules in 
sub-sections 4.1–4.5. Sub-section 4.6 contains the estimates of time-varying inflation persistence 
and sub-section 4.7 provides a summary of the main policy-relevant findings. 
 
4.1 United Kingdom 
Our results show that the BoE significantly increased its response to inflation from the late 1970s 
till the mid-1980s. This overlaps with the Thatcher government and its major priority of inflation 
control. The overall decline of the response since 1985 can be related to the dismissal of the 
medium-term financial strategy (adopted in 1979). We find that the response of interest rates to 
inflation was gradually decreasing during the 1990s in spite of the introduction of IT. Although 
this finding may seem at first sight counterintuitive, it is important to keep in mind that, unlike in 
some emerging countries, IT was not implemented in the UK as a strong anti-inflation strategy. 
Inflation had already been contained in the 1980s and the very benign inflation environment was 
also supported by declining prices of raw materials on world markets. This corroborates with the 
findings of Kuttner and Posen (1999) and Sekine and Teranishi (2008), who show that inflation 
targeting can be associated with less aggressive monetary policy.  
 
 The effect of the output gap is estimated as positive (although the confidence intervals are rather 
large, probably reflecting the fact that the gap is an unobserved variable and calculated ex post) 
and does not vary substantially over time. The interest rate smoothing parameter is found to have 
values between 0.1 and 0.3, which is much lower than typically reported by time-invariant 
estimates of monetary policy rules (Clarida et al., 1998, 2000). Our estimates seem to be 
reasonable in the face of the recent critique by Rudebusch (2006). Finally, in this basic model the 
intercept can be interpreted as the policy neutral (nominal) interest rate. We can see that it has 
steadily declined over time, which is consistent with the low inflation environment that prevailed 
in the UK in the 1990s. 
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Figure 1 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
UK 
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Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The upper-left graph depicts the evolution of the neutral rate. The upper-right graph depicts the evolution of 
the response of interest rates to inflation. The lower-left graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rates 
to the output gap. The lower-right graph depicts the evolution of the interest rate smoothing parameter. 
 
The results of our augmented model show that the monetary policy of the BoE was influenced 
by external factors, although their importance was greater in the 1980s than recently.21 In 
particular, we find evidence that the BoE decreased its policy rate as the nominal effective 
exchange rate (NEER) strengthened during the 1980s even before the pound officially joined the 
ERM (1990). Yet, once the UK abandoned the ERM and introduced IT, the BoE no longer 
seemed to react explicitly to the exchange rate. Obviously, it considered the exchange rate 
indirectly, as exchange rate fluctuations influence the inflation forecast (for more on this see 
Taylor, 2001). The same reasoning applies to the response to the foreign interest rate (Euribor). 
                                                                                       
21 In what follows, we present the evolution of the coefficients for the response to the exchange rate and foreign 
interest rates; the other coefficients remain largely unchanged and are not reported for the sake of brevity.  
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It was particularly strong during the 1980s and subsequently its importance somewhat declined. 
Our results show little support for the hypothesis that the monetary policy of the BoE follows 
that of the ECB, as the estimated response of the coefficient declined and the confidence 
intervals widened after the launch of the euro. 
 
Figure 2 – Time-varying response coefficients in augmented (open economy) policy rule, 
UK 
Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The left-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rate to the nominal effective exchange 
rate (the deviation from the HP trend). The right-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of the interest 
rate to the foreign interest rate. 
 
There are two studies directly comparable with this paper. Kishor (2008) obtains results similar to 
ours in spite of using monthly data known to have slightly different dynamics. He finds that the 
anti-inflation stance peaked in the mid-1980s and tended to decline from then onwards in spite of 
the adoption of IT. Similarly, his finding that the response to the foreign interest rate significantly 
declined after the ERM crisis is complementary to our result that the BoE gave much less 
consideration to the evolution of the exchange rate (the NEER gap).  
 
Trecroci and Vassalli (2010), who, unlike Kishor (2008) and this paper, do not correct for 
endogeneity in the time-varying model, come to the opposite conclusion that the BoE’s response 
to inflation increased over time. Yet, some counterintuitive results of their study point to the 
possibility of endogeneity bias. First, the interest rate smoothing parameter takes on significantly 
negative values from 1980 till 1995. This would imply not only that policy was not inertial, but 
also that there was actually a negative correlation between the present and past interest rate, 
which is inconsistent even in the face of a simple visual inspection of the interest rate series. 
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
UBDELTA LBDELTA DELTA
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
LB_NEER UB_NEER A_NEER
 20
When we estimate our model without the endogeneity-correcting coefficients we obtain a similar 
result (see Appendix, Figure A.1).22 Second, their coefficient for the foreign (German) interest 
rate peaks in 1990 and is de facto invariant since then, which the authors interpret as implicit 
exchange-rate targeting. This finding is doubtful given the pound’s exit from the ERM and the 
implementation of IT from 1992 onwards. In fact, British and German short-term rates, which 
were almost at par in 1992, diverged and the interbank interest rate in the UK exceeded the 
German one by almost 4% on the eve of euro adoption. 
 
4.2 New Zealand 
New Zealand was the first country in the world to introduce inflation targeting, doing so by 
means of the Federal Bank Act signed in March 1990.23 Our results indicate that the response of 
the RBNZ to expected inflation was very close to unity throughout the sample period (1985–
2007). In fact, it is clearly visible that the interest rate and inflation series move together very 
closely. However, in Figure 3 we can also see that the official introduction of IT does not seem to 
have engendered a significant change in interest rate setting (if anything there is very slight 
decrease of the response coefficient on inflation). Unlike in the UK, the response coefficient 
does not decrease substantially. This may be related to the fact that at the time IT was introduced 
in New Zealand the inflation rate was not far from double-digit values. Therefore, this policy was 
implemented in a different context than, say, in the UK, where single-digit inflation had already 
been achieved during the 1980s.24 This result, together with the estimated insignificant response 
to the output gap, is consistent with the findings of time-invariant studies (Huang et al., 2001; 
Plantier and Scrimgeour, 2002) that the RBNZ applied a rather strict version of inflation 
targeting. Finally, we find that the interest rate smoothing parameter is again rather modest. 
 
                                                                                       
22 The bias correction terms are significant when we estimate the model addressing endogeneity, even though the 
economic significance is in general not large – see the Appendix.  
23 Huang et al. (2001) argue that this policy was in effect since the end of 1988, when the RBNZ abandoned both 
monetary and exchange rate targeting. They also point to a specific feature of RBNZ monetary policy that could be 
referred to as “Open Mouth Operations”. Between 1989 and 1999 the RBNZ specified a 90-day bank bill rate 
consistent with price stability and threatened to use quantitative controls to achieve the desired market rate if it 
deviated from the target. Therefore, the RBNZ did not control this interest rate permanently and directly. 
24 At the end of 1986 New Zealand introduced VAT, which had a direct impact on the inflation rate in the following 
two quarters. Consequently, we include a time dummy in Q1 and Q2 1987, whose coefficient is estimated as positive 
and significant. 
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Figure 3 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
New Zealand 
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Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The upper-left graph depicts the evolution of the neutral rate. The upper-right graph depicts the evolution of 
the response of interest rates to inflation. The lower-left graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rates 
to the output gap. The lower-right graph depicts the evolution of the interest rate smoothing parameter. 
 
When we estimate the augmented model for New Zealand, the evidence for the exchange rate is 
not conclusive. We find a positive response to the NEER, which is rather counterintuitive in 
terms of the Taylor rule. However, the coefficient is significant only before the introduction of 
IT and its positive sign is probably related to currency appreciation following the interest rate 
increase. In that period the RBNZ aimed to keep the exchange rate within a predefined range and 
the interest rate was probably set so as to influence the exchange rate ex ante rather than ex post. 
Consistent with this finding, Ftiti (2008) in a time-invariant model rejects the hypothesis that the 
RBNZ responded to the exchange rate. On the other hand, we find some evidence in favor of 
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consideration of the foreign interest rate, although its response coefficient generally decreased 
after the launch of IT. 
 
Figure 4 – Time-varying response coefficients in augmented (open economy) policy rule, 
New Zealand 
Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The left-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rate to the nominal effective exchange 
rate (the deviation from the HP trend). The right-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of the interest 
rate to the foreign interest rate. 
 
4.3 Australia 
Our results for Australia are available in Figures 5 and 6. The response of the interest rate to 
inflation is strongest in the 1980s, which is very similar to the UK experience. This period was 
characterized by inflation rates of around 10% and central bankers had to be quite aggressive in 
interest rate setting in order to break the record of high inflation deeply ingrained in public 
expectations. Neither monetary targeting (employed until 1984) nor the checklist approach 
(1985–1990) seemed to be successful in this regard. The fluctuation of the inflation response 
coefficient points to the discretionary nature of policy decisions (making this finding consistent 
with Leu and Sheen, 2006). The response coefficient peaks in 1990 on the eve of IT but declines 
after the adoption of this regime. It is again arguable whether it was the credibility of this regime 
that anchored inflation expectations and allowed the RBA to behave less aggressively. The 
original inflation decline may also have been related to the world recession in the early 1990s. 
Our results dispute the finding of De Brouwer and Gordon (2005) that the inflation response of 
the RBA increased as a result of the launch of inflation targeting.  
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As for other countries, the neutral rate declines in the 1990s, reflecting the global low inflation 
environment. The output gap is not found to be significant and the estimated interest rate 
smoothing is again rather low. 
 
Figure 5 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
Australia 
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Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The upper-left graph depicts the evolution of the neutral rate. The upper-right graph depicts the evolution of 
the response of interest rates to inflation. The lower-left graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rates 
to the output gap. The lower-right graph depicts the evolution of the interest rate smoothing parameter. 
 
We find that the exchange rate does not have a significant effect on the short-term interest rate 
(besides the NEER we use also the trade-weighted index – TWI, which is an exchange rate 
measure reported and often referred to by the RBA) except in the period of 1985–87, when the 
currency depreciation (the Australian dollar was allowed to float in 1983 after a period of a 
moving peg vis-à-vis the TWI) was offset by an interest rate increase so as to curb the inflation 
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pressures (see Greenville, 1997). The foreign interest rate parameter is estimated as being always 
positive, although it is significant only in the 1990s and its importance fades after IT was 
introduced. After 2001, Australian and U.S. interest rates diverge and the response coefficient 
approaches zero. This may be related to idiosyncratic developments in the U.S. when the Fed 
lowered the interest rate so as to face the fear of recession following the September 2001 terrorist 
attacks. 
 
Figure 6 – Time-varying response coefficients in augmented (open economy) policy rule, 
Australia 
Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The left-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rate to the nominal effective exchange 
rate (the deviation from the HP trend). The right-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of the interest 
rate to the foreign interest rate. 
 
4.4 Canada 
The monetary policy rule estimates for Canada are presented in Figures 7 and 8. The response of 
the interest rate to inflation peaks in the first half of the 1980s and in the mid-1990s. The former 
period was characterized by relatively high inflation rates, which unquestionably drove the rather 
aggressive policy of the BoC similarly as in the UK and Australia. It is arguable whether the 
original inflation rate was a consequence of the accommodative policy of monetary targeting 
applied between 1978 and 1982 (see Figure 7). Unlike in the UK and Australia, the inflation 
response coefficient increased temporarily after the announcement of IT, which reflects the fact 
that IT was adopted as a part of a joint disinflation strategy of the BoC and the federal 
government. Then it decreases only in the last decade (due to almost negligible inflation rates).25 
                                                                                       
25 The BoC also reported the monetary condition index (MCI), a compound of the policy instrument (the interest 
rate) and the exchange rate. The MCI accompanies the proposal of Ball (1999) to target long-term inflation, i.e. the 
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The response to the output gap is significant and almost invariant in time (as in the UK), 
confirming the long-term preference of the BoC for smoothing economic fluctuations. The 
intensity of the response is unique among the IT countries in our sample. The interest rate 
smoothing is almost negligible. 
 
Figure 7 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
Canada 
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
RHO RHO_UB RHO_LB
 
Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The upper-left graph depicts the evolution of the neutral rate. The upper-right graph depicts the evolution of 
the response of interest rates to inflation. The lower-left graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rates 
to the output gap. The lower-right graph depicts the evolution of the interest rate smoothing parameter. 
 
The dependence of Canadian monetary policy on external factors, in particular developments in 
the U.S., is confirmed in the model augmented by the exchange rate and foreign interest rate. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
inflation rate adjusted for the transitory effect of the exchange rate on import prices. However, there is no indication 
that the BoC actually ever used the MCI for practical policy making, and it ceased to publish it in 2006.  
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
75 80 85 90 95 00 05
BETA UBBETA LBBETA
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
75 80 85 90 95 00 05
GAMMA UBGAMMA LBGAMMA
-4
0
4
8
12
16
75 80 85 90 95 00 05
ALPHA LBALPHA UBALPHA
 26
response to the exchange rate is positive but almost insignificant and dissipates in the last decade. 
On the other hand, the response to the U.S. interest rate dynamics is substantial for the whole 
period of analysis until the end of the sample. 
 
Figure 8 – Time-varying response coefficients in augmented (open economy) policy rule, 
Canada 
Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The left-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rate to the nominal effective exchange 
rate (the deviation from the HP trend). The right-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of the interest 
rate to the foreign interest rate. 
 
4.5 Sweden 
Our results suggest that the response of interest rates to inflation was stronger before and at the 
beginning of IT. This is in line with Berg et al. (2004), who argue that the introductory phase of 
IT in Sweden was characterized by building the credibility of the new regime. The decline of the 
neutral rate reflects the low inflation environment prevailing in Sweden from the mid-1990s 
onwards. The time-varying coefficient on interest rate smoothing is estimated to be somewhat 
larger in Sweden than in the other countries. This suggests that Sveriges Riksbank is likely to 
smooth its interest rates to a greater degree.26 
 
                                                                                       
26 At the time of the ERM crisis (September 1992), the Swedish krona started to depreciate. SR tried (unsuccessfully) 
to maintain the previous exchange rate and massively increased the short-term interest rate. Consequently, we have 
included a time dummy in Q3 1992. 
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Figure 9 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
Sweden 
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Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The upper-left graph depicts the evolution of the neutral rate. The upper-right graph depicts the evolution of 
the response of interest rates to inflation. The lower-left graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rates 
to the output gap. The lower-right graph depicts the evolution of the interest rate smoothing parameter. 
 
Our results imply a prominent role for external factors rather than the output gap for the 
determination of Swedish monetary policy. In particular, the coefficient on the foreign interest 
rate (Eurolibor) is sizeable throughout the sample period, which is rather interesting given that 
Swedish monetary policy has not officially been subject to any external constraint (at least since 
the krona’s exit from the ERM in 1992). On the other hand, the role of the exchange rate is 
unclear. The NEER response coefficient is mostly positive, but with very wide confidence 
intervals, pointing to its insignificance. 
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Our results are consistent overall with the surveyed time-invariant studies emphasizing the 
predominant role of the inflation forecast (Jansson and Vredin, 2003) as well as more cautious 
policy decisions leading to more policy inertia during periods of macroeconomic instability such 
as the ERM crisis (Berg at al., 2004). 
  
Figure 10 – Time-varying response coefficients in augmented (open economy) policy 
rule, Sweden 
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Note: 95% confidence bands; model with bias correction terms, i.e. dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy 
rules. The left-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of interest rate to the nominal effective exchange 
rate (the deviation from the HP trend). The right-hand graph depicts the evolution of the response of the interest 
rate to the foreign interest rate. 
 
4.6 Inflation Targeting and Inflation Persistence 
We have related our finding that the inflation response coefficient often falls after the adoption 
of IT to the hypothesis that this monetary framework has a positive effect on the inflation 
expectations of economic agents. If expected inflation is low, monetary policy need not be as 
aggressive as under a discretionary regime in order to achieve price stability. This argument is in 
line with recent studies on inflation dynamics (Benati, 2008; Zhang et al., 2008) claiming that 
under a credible policy regime (such as IT), inflation persistence (the dependence of current 
inflation on past values) fades away.  
 
To shed some light on this issue, we used our estimation framework and fitted the AR(1) model 
with drift to inflation series, allowing the coefficient on lagged inflation as well as the constant to 
be time-varying. Our results (as reported in Figure 11) indicate that inflation persistence 
decreased over time for all the countries. Moreover, it is notable that the persistence fell 
especially during the 1990s as IT was introduced. This finding is confirmed when, in the spirit of 
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the backward-looking Phillips curve, we include the lagged output gap as a forcing variable.27 In 
addition, the results reported in Figure 11 clearly indicate that the moment estimator applied to 
the time-varying coefficient approach is suitable even if the estimated coefficient is subject to 
sudden switches rather than smooth transition (see the UK after the adoption of inflation 
targeting).  
 
In general, our results are broadly consistent with those of Benati (2008), who performs sub-
sample analysis under different policy regimes. Unlike Benati (2008), our approach does not need 
to impose breaks in the inflation process at any particular date, but simply observes whether and 
when such breaks occur. Our findings do not exclude the possibility that inflation persistence 
decreased because of other factors (the “good luck” hypothesis), but the temporal coincidence 
between the introduction of IT and the significant decrease of inflation persistence in several 
countries make a case for the “good policy” hypothesis. Taking the example of the UK, we can 
see that the inflation (rate) moderation goes back to the 1980s, when we still observe rather high 
inflation persistence in spite of very aggressive anti-inflationary (yet discretionary) policy. 
Unfortunately, as we do not have a full structural model we cannot tell much about the nature of 
shocks in the pre- and post-IT period as done in VAR studies on the Great Moderation. Using 
standard tests of structural stability, we can clearly reject structural stability of the inflation 
process defined by AR(1) in the pre- and post-IT period. 
 
Figure 11 – Time-varying response coefficients in AR(1) model for inflation 
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27 See Hondroyiannis et al. (2009) on the estimation of the Phillips curve within a somewhat different time-varying 
framework. 
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Note: 95% confidence bands; the coefficient of the AR(1) term (i.e. model 1t t t t tpi α ρ pi ε−= + + ) for the inflation series 
employed in the previous analysis for each country.  
 
4.7 Monetary Policy Rules – Wrap-Up of Main Policy Findings 
This sub-section summarizes the main policy-relevant findings of this paper. We focus on the 
following four issues: 1) monetary policy aggressiveness and the inflation rate, 2) monetary policy 
aggressiveness and inflation targeting, 3) interest rate smoothing and 4) inflation persistence and 
inflation targeting. 
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Figure 12 – Monetary Policy Aggressiveness and Inflation Targeting 
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Note: The y axis depicts the evolution of the estimated parameter (β ) (the response of interest rates to expected 
inflation) and the x axis represents time, with the year of inflation targeting adoption denoted by a black vertical line. 
The value of β  for New Zealand is plotted on the right-hand axis. 
 
Figure 12 presents the link between monetary policy aggressiveness (defined as the estimate of 
the response of interest rates to expected inflation) and inflation targeting. It can be seen that in 
no country did the aggressiveness parameter increase after the adoption of inflation targeting. In 
fact, this aggressiveness substantially decreased in the UK, Australia and Sweden. If we look at 
the link between aggressiveness and expected inflation within the IT period, the results suggest 
that in most countries the aggressiveness is higher the more expected inflation deviates from its 
target. This broadly corresponds to the findings of Davradakis and Taylor (2006), who document 
a non-linear policy rule for the UK of a similar pattern.  
 
Figure 13 documents a relatively strong link between the level of inflation and monetary policy 
aggressiveness for the UK, Australia and Sweden. This is because 1) the response of interest rates 
to inflation has been particularly strong during periods when central bankers want to break a 
record of high inflation and 2) the response has been less aggressive after the adoption of 
inflation targeting with well-anchored inflation expectations. In contrast, New Zealand and 
Canada do not seem to exhibit a link between aggressiveness and inflation. 
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Figure 13 – Monetary Policy Aggressiveness and Inflation Rate 
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Note: The figure presents the scatter plots between the inflation rate and the response of interest rates to expected 
inflation (β ), labeled as aggressiveness, for each country individually.  
 
The evolution of the estimated interest rate smoothing parameter in comparison to the time-
invariant estimates for the UK in 1979–1990 by Clarida et al. (2000) is available in Figure 14. Our 
time-varying estimates of interest rate smoothing are well below the time-invariant one, which 
seems reasonable in the light of the recent critique by Rudebusch (2006), who puts forward that 
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the degree of interest rate smoothing is actually low. While omitted variables or persistent shocks 
were deemed to be behind the implausible degree of policy inertia, our empirical results suggest 
that omission of the time-varying nature of the response coefficient may be another reason for 
the overestimation of smoothing coefficient ρ in time-invariant policy rules. Moreover, given 
that the policy rule is modeled as a partial adjustment (see Eq. (3)), the overestimation of 
smoothing coefficient ρ  may drive the upper bias in all the other coefficients. This seems to 
explain why our long-term inflation multiplier β  is substantially lower than found in time-
invariant studies. Though a high β  is consistent with common wisdom, we suspect that it is a by-
product of the upper bias in ρ . 
 
Figure 14 – Interest Rate Smoothing 
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Note: The figure presents the evolution of the estimated interest rate smoothing parameter ρ  over time in 
comparison to the interest rate smoothing parameter estimated in the time-invariant model of Clarida et al. (2000) 
for the UK. 
 
 34
Figure 15 – Inflation Targeting and Inflation Persistence 
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Note: The y axis depicts the evolution of the estimated inflation persistence parameter and the y axis represents time, 
with the year of inflation targeting adoption denoted by a black vertical line.  
 
Finally, the results in Figure 15 plot the estimates of inflation persistence over time for all 
countries with respect to the inflation targeting adoption date. The results suggest that inflation 
persistence decreased after the adoption of inflation targeting, with a very distinct fall in the UK 
and New Zealand.  
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we shed light on the evolution of monetary policy in the main inflation targeting 
central banks during the last three decades. The evolution of monetary policy is evaluated within 
a novel framework of a time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors (Kim and 
Nelson, 2006), further addressing small sample issues (Schlicht, 1981; Schlicht, 2005; Schlicht and 
Ludsteck, 2006). 
 
In our view, the results point to the usefulness of this econometric framework for analysis of the 
evolution of monetary policy setting. The estimation of standard monetary policy rules reveals 
that policy changes gradually and the changes coincide with several important institutional 
reforms as well as with the periods when the central banks successfully decreased double-digit 
inflation rates to rates consistent with their definitions of price stability.  
 
In this respect, our results suggest that the response of interest rates to inflation is particularly 
high during periods when central bankers want to break a record of high inflation, such as in the 
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UK in the early 1980s. Contrary to common wisdom, the response is often found to be less 
aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting, suggesting a positive anchoring effect of this 
regime on inflation expectations. In other words, monetary policy need not be as aggressive as 
under a discretionary regime in order to achieve price stability (Kuttner and Posen, 1999). This 
result is supported by our finding that inflation becomes less inertial and the policy neutral rate 
decreases after the adoption of inflation targeting. 
 
We find that external factors matter for interest rate setting in all our sample countries. To be 
more precise, the foreign interest rate is found to enter the monetary policy rule significantly. The 
importance of the exchange rate varies, being apparently more important before the countries 
adopted inflation targeting than afterwards.  
 
Our results also indicate that interest rate smoothing is much lower than typically reported by 
time-invariant estimates of monetary policy rules (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1998, 2000). 
Our estimates support the recent critique by Rudebusch (2006), who argues that the degree of 
interest rate smoothing is rather low. We suggest that neglect of changes in monetary policy 
setting over time is the reason for the implausible degree of policy inertia previously found. 
Moreover, the fact that upper bias in the smoothing parameter affects all the estimates may 
explain some fundamental differences between our findings and those established in the 
literature, such as the size of the inflation response coefficient. 
 
In terms of future research we believe it would be worthwhile to apply this framework to better 
understand whether and how monetary policy reacts to periods of financial instability and which 
types of financial instability are the most worrying for central banks. In consequence, this would 
improve the understanding of both the interest rate setting process and the reaction of monetary 
policy makers to the current global financial crisis in a more systematic manner. 
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Appendix 
 
1 The VC method (Schlicht and Ludsteck, 2006) 
 
In this section, we closely follow the Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006) paper. Consider a standard 
linear model: 
                               ( )20, 1,2nt t t t ty = a'x + u , a, x ,u ~ N σ , t = , T∈ …R                       (A.1) 
It can be extended for the case in which the coefficients a are allowed to follow a random walk. 
Then equation (A.1) is replaced by a system 
                                                    ( )20,t t t t ty = a 'x + u , u ~ N σ                                          (A.2) 
                                                      ( )1 0,t+ t t ta = a + v , v ~ N Σ                                           (A.3) 
with one signal equation (A.2) and n state equations (A.3) for each time-varying parameter. The 
variance-covariance matrix Σ is assumed to be diagonal, that is 
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v = v
v
v
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
of order     T × 1  T ×1             Tn × 1          (T-1)n × 1 
The system (A.2) and (A.3) can be rewritten as 
                                                   ( )20, Ty = Xa + u, u ~ N σ I                                             (A.4) 
                                             ( ) 10, TPa = v, v ~ N V ,V = I Σ− ⊗                                       (A.5) 
Estimation of the model based on equations (A.4) and (A.5) requires derivation of a distribution 
function that maps the random variables tu  and tv  to a set of observations tX . However, such 
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inference is not possible because the matrix P  in (A.5) is of rank ( )1T n−  rather than Tn  and 
thus it cannot be inverted. Furthermore, any v  does not determine the path of ta  uniquely.  
 
1.1 Orthogonal parameterization 
The VC method used in this paper starts with an explicit definition of a set of possible values of a 
conditioned by matrix P and random variable v. Following equation (A.5) any solution a can be 
written as 
                                                             ( ) 1a = P' PP' v + Zλ−                                               (A.6) 
with λ∈R and 1 n
n
n
Z = I
T
I
I
            

. 
Hence equation (A.5) becomes 
                                                         ( ) 1y = u + XP' PP' v + XZλ−                                        (A.7) 
Equations (A.6) and (A.7) build an orthogonal parameterization of the true model (A.4) and (A5). The 
orthogonally parametrized model implies that ta  follows a random walk and that its path 
depends on all realizations of a random variable tv .
28 
The equation (A.7) can be written as 
                                                                       y = XZλ+ w                                                   (A.8) 
where 
                                                                ( ) 1w = XP' PP' v + u−                                            (A.9) 
Variable w  is normally distributed: 
                                                       ( ) 20, Tw ~ N W , W = XBX' + σ I                               (A.10) 
with 
                                                            ( ) ( )1 1B = P' PP' V PP' P− −                                     (A.11) 
Let the matrix of the observations follow a conventional format: 
                                                          
*
1
2
'
n
'
n
'
n T
X = T XZ = X I = x
I x
I x
  
  
  
  
    
  

                                 (A.12) 
Inserting (A.12) into (A.8) implies a generalized linear regression model 
                                                                                       
28 To avoid excessive number o indexes, we skipped the time index t in the latter part of the text. 
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*1y = X λ+ w = Xβ+ w
T
                                       (A.13) 
with 
                                                                      
1
ˆˆ
= λ
T
β                                                      (A.14) 
The estimate of ˆλ  satisfies 
                                                       ( ) 11 1ˆ = Z'X'W XZ Z'X'W yλ −− −                                     (A.15) 
which is a standard GLS estimator of the classical regression problem with a covariance matrix of 
residuals W  and observations ZX . Taking expectations of a from (A.6) and substituting ˆλ  for λ  
implies Z'a = λ  and hence 
1
1 T
t
t=
a = β
T ∑
 in the GLS regression (A.13). 
 
1.2 Estimation of coefficients 
The orthogonal parameterization derived in the previous section might be used for direct ML 
estimation of the time-varying parameters a. However, the derivation of the ML estimate of the 
vector of parameters a leads to a formulation that is equivalent to the minimization of the 
weighted sum of squares 
                                                2 2 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
T T T T
n n
t= t= t= t=
u +θ v +θ v + +θ v…∑ ∑ ∑ ∑                                (A.16) 
where the weights iθ  are the inverse variance ratios of the regression residuals tu  and the shocks 
in time-varying coefficients tv , that is 
2 2/i iθ = σ σ . The proof can be found in Schlicht and 
Ludsteck, 2006, section 5. Hence the estimator balances the fit of the model and the parameter 
stability.29  
Now we derive the formula used for estimation of the coefficients. For given X and y the 
estimated disturbances are 
                                                                 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
u = y Xa
v = Pa
−
                                                      (A.17) 
Using the expressions for the estimated disturbances (16), minimization of the weighted sum of 
squares (15) implies 
                                                      ( )2 1 ˆX'X +σ P'V P a = X'y−                                          (A.18) 
which is used for the estimation of coefficients ˆta . 
                                                                                       
29 Originally, Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006) start with a derivation of the maximum likelihood estimator of 
parameters a based on the idea of orthogonal parameterization, which is described in the Appendix. Then they prove 
that the weighted least squares estimator is identical to the maximum likelihood estimator. 
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The coefficients estimated using the VC method have a straightforward interpretation: they have 
a time-invariant part, determined by a regression with fixed coefficients, and a random part 
reflecting the idea that some proportion of the variance of the dependent variable is caused by a 
change in the coefficients.  
The estimation procedure proceeds as follows. The iterative procedure has two steps. First, given 
the variances of the residuals in both equations in (15), 2σ and 2iσ , the coefficients are estimated 
using (17). Second, the estimated residuals are calculated using (16) and their estimated second 
moments ˆ ˆu'u  and ˆ ˆi iv' v  are compared to their expected moments [ ]ˆ ˆE u'u  and [ ]ˆ ˆi iE v' v . These 
steps are repeated until the estimated moments are identical to their expected counterparts (for a 
precise derivation of the moment estimator as well as computational details see Schlicht and 
Ludsteck, 2006, sections 6–9). 
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2 The effect of endogeneity in the policy rule  
 
 
Figure A.1 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
UK 
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Note: Model with bias correction terms (solid line); model not dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy rules 
(dashed line). The 95% confidence bands correspond to the model with bias correction terms. 
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Figure A.2 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
New Zealand 
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Note: Model with bias correction terms (solid line); model not dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy rules 
(dashed line). The 95% confidence bands correspond to the model with bias correction terms. 
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Figure A.3 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
Australia 
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Note: Model with bias correction terms (solid line); model not dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy rules 
(dashed line). The 95% confidence bands correspond to the model with bias correction terms. 
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Figure A.4 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
Canada 
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Note: Model with bias correction terms (solid line); model not dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy rules 
(dashed line). The 95% confidence bands correspond to the model with bias correction terms. 
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Figure A.5 – Time-varying response coefficients in baseline (closed economy) policy rule, 
Sweden 
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Note: Model with bias correction terms (solid line); model not dealing with endogeneity in monetary policy rules 
(dashed line). The 95% confidence bands correspond to the model with bias correction terms. 
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Table A.1 Estimated Coefficients of Endogeneity Correction Terms 
 
UK NZ Aus Can Swe
Inflation mean -0.0183 -1.06 -0.17 -0.873 -0.329
s.e. 0.269 0.337 0.0912 0.146 0.119
GDP gap mean 0.0745 -0.031 0.014 -0.127 0.0781
s.e. 0.125 0.27 0.092 0.0559 0.0808  
Note: Bold: sign. at 5%, italic: sign. at 10%. 
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